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REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
QIHAO HE & MICHAEL FAURE
***
Under the influence of climate-related extremes, the world is exposed to
more and more catastrophe risks. Increasingly it is held that the
government alone may not be able to adequately prevent disaster risks; a
combination of public and private regulation is therefore warranted.
Regulation via insurance may help to realize the goal of disaster risk
reduction and to mitigate the corresponding losses. In this article we
identify five regulatory tools — risk-based pricing, contract design, loss
prevention services, claim management, and refusal to insure — that can be
used by catastrophe insurers with the aim of disaster risk reduction.
Subsequently, we explore how these tools are used in practice by insurers in
five countries: United Kingdom, United States, France, Japan, and Turkey.
In doing so, we find that regulation through catastrophe insurance could
have a positive effect on disaster risk reduction. However, the possibilities
to regulate by insurance are in many countries de facto limited as a result of
state intervention. Finally, we discuss the possibility and feasibility of
regulation by catastrophe insurance in China, where it is not yet utilized.
***
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INTRODUCTION

According to Beck the current era is characterized as a “risk
society”. 1 Under the influence of climate extremes and other natural
disasters, the world is exposed to more and more catastrophe risks. 2
Although catastrophe risk events occur infrequently, such events result in
significant human and financial losses. There is increasing attention not
only to the question of how to compensate victims, but also to how
compensation mechanisms, including insurance, can stimulate disaster risk
reduction.3
Increasingly insurance is seen as a tool to “outsource” public
regulation.4 In order to remedy the risk of moral hazard, inherent in any
insurance contract, insurers “regulate” how organizations and individuals
should deal with specific risks.5 Private insurance can act not only as a form
of post-disaster relief but also as a form of private regulation—a contractual
1

Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, THEORY,
CULTURE & SOC’Y SERIES (1992).
2
Data from large reinsurers show that the amounts and damage
resulting from both man-made and natural disasters have been increasing
over the past 30 years. See Lucia Bevere, Kristen Orwig & Rajeev Sharan,
Natural Catastrophes and Man-made Disasters in 2014: Convective and
Winter Storms Generate Most Losses, SWISS RE INSTITUTION (2015),
http://www.actuarialpost.co.uk/downloads/cat_1/sigma2_2015_en.pdf;
Munich Re, Topics GEO National catastrophes 2013 Analyses,
assessments, positions (2014), http://www.munichre.com/site/corporate/
get/documents_E1043212252/mr/assetpool.shared/Documents/5_Touch/_
Publications/302-08121_en.pdf.
3
For example, The 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action highlights the
urgency to advance the expansion of insurance markets to finance risk
following a natural disaster. See J. David Cummins & Oliver Mahul,
Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing Countries, THE WORLD BANK
(2009); In the EU the Green Paper on the insurance of natural and
man-made disasters equally pays attention to the ability of insurance to
provide compensation and to stimulate risk-mitigating behavior. See
Enhance, Green Paper on The Insurance of Natural and Man-Made
Disasters, (COM (2013) 213 final) (2013).
4
Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 200 (2012).
5
Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541
(1979).
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device controlling and motivating behavior prior to the occurrence of a
loss.6 Insurance is a well-known tool of risk management that addresses
three aspects of risk management: risk assessment (or risk analysis), risk
control, and risk financing.7 From society’s perspective, insurance has at
least two important functions. The first is that it can spread risks over a
larger community and thus compensate risk-averse individuals exposed to
risky activities through risk pooling and risk shifting. A second function is
that by controlling the moral hazard, risk insurers also regulate
policyholders’ behavior and can thus contribute to risk reduction. Insurers
can have these important functions also for catastrophe risks, provided
specific conditions are met.8 The increasing amount of catastrophe losses is
to a large extent due to an increasing contact between mankind and natural
events. As a result of growing demographic pressures, there has been an
increasing movement of population to high-risk areas, such as the coastal
areas in Florida. This combined with aging infrastructure and low levels of
public and private investment in disaster risk reduction increases the losses
due to catastrophes. Insurance can, so we will argue, play an important role
in preventing disaster losses and mitigating losses after a disaster has
occurred. Given the increasing exposure of the population to catastrophe
losses, the importance of insurance as a tool to regulate risky behavior only
increases. 9 Once insurers underwrite catastrophe risk, they have every
reason to try to reduce their payouts. Therefore, regulation by insurance
may help realize the goal of disaster risk reduction and the corresponding
losses.
6

Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized
Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016).
7
J. FRANÇOIS OUTREVILLE, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE
45-64 (Kluwer Academic Publisher ed. 1998); ROB THOYTS, INSURANCE
THEORY AND PRACTICE 286-295 (Routledge ed., 2010); EMMETT J.
VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND
INSURANCE 16 (Judith Joseph et al. eds., 10th ed. 2007).
8
George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of
Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996).
9
Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Have We Entered an Ever-Growing Cycle on
Government Disaster Relief?, Presentation to U.S. Senate Committee on
Small Business and Entrepreneurship (2013).

192

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 24.2

Although there is general agreement on the important contribution
of insurers to disaster risk reduction, less is known about the precise
instruments and techniques used by insurers to achieve disaster risk
reduction. This Article identifies under which specific conditions insurance
can function as a substitute for, or a complement to, government regulation
of catastrophe risks associated with natural disasters. This Article identifies
five regulatory techniques of catastrophe insurance that may complement,
and in some cases perhaps even outperform, government regulation by
creating incentives for optimal behavior for individuals and organizations.
The Article then compares five middle to high-income countries—the
United Kingdom, the United States, France, Japan, and Turkey—in which
catastrophe risks are regulated by insurance. In this comparison, we analyze
the role of the state in facilitating regulation through insurance by
examining to what extent the tools to control moral hazard are encouraged
or restricted by government regulation.
In Part II we review the literature describing how, specifically in
the field of catastrophe insurance, insurers can exercise regulatory functions
aiming at disaster risk reduction. In Part III we discuss five specific tools
that can contribute to disaster risk reduction. Part IV provides examples of
the use of those regulatory techniques in five different countries, both
developed and developing. Part V provides a comparative discussion
concerning the effectiveness of regulation via catastrophe insurance.
Finally, Part VI discusses the possibility and feasibility of regulation by
catastrophe insurance in China, where it is not yet utilized.

II.

INSURANCE AS A TOOL OF DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

Any insurance contract, whether it is first party (victim) insurance
or third party (liability) insurance is vulnerable to the moral hazard risk.
Many stress the fact that insurance leads to moral hazard. Therefore it is at
first blush often considered as increasing risk, rather than as a tool of risk
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reduction.10 Moral hazard is the tendency of insureds from vulnerable areas
to exercise less care in avoiding losses than they would if the losses were
not covered by insurers.11 Admittedly, it is only logical for the insureds to
change their behavior as soon as the risk is fully removed from them.12
Such changes in behavior is in that sense not “immoral”. The moral hazard
risk is especially problematic as far as liability insurance is concerned. The
reason is that an exposure to liability provides incentives for the prevention
of accidents to potential insurers. Moral hazard could endanger those
incentives for prevention and may therefore have socially negative
consequences. In that case liability insurance should be prohibited since it
would increase risk in society.13 Remedies for moral hazard are available.
The best option is monitoring by the insurer and a corresponding adaptation
of premium conditions.14 This solution is thought to be the best since risk
would be completely removed from a risk adverse individual. The
second-best option is still to expose an insured partially to risk, either by
applying deductibles or an upper limit on coverage.15 In practice, insurers
will apply a combination of different techniques (risk differentiation,
specific conditions in policies and deductibles) to control moral hazard.16 It
is precisely through this control of the moral hazard risk that insurers will
act as de facto regulators and invest in risk prevention. This article will
10

See Bengt Hölmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J.
Econ. 74 (1979).
11
Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarcz, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION, 7 (6th ed. 2015).
12
Mark Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AMER.
ECON. REV. 531(1968).
13
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120,
120-32 (1982).
14
This can take place ex ante (through a so-called risk classification) or
ex post (after the accident) through experience rating. The latter implies
effectively that the premium would be increased after a reported incident.
15
Hsin-Chun Wang, Adaptation to Climate Change and Insurance
Mechanism: A Feasible Proposal Based on a Catastrophe Insurance Model
for Taiwan, 9 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 317 (2014).
16
See Shavell, supra note 5; Steven Shavell, On the Social Function
and Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
166, 168-70 (2000).
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show that through this control of the moral hazard, risk insurers are viewed
as private (risk) regulators and that through this control of moral hazard
they can contribute to disaster risk reduction.
A. INSURANCE AS PRIVATE (RISK) REGULATION
Regulation by insurance is not the same as insurance regulation.
The latter is a classic topic of insurance law, and mainly discusses how the
insurance business and organizations are regulated by administrative
agencies. 17 On the other hand, regulation by insurance explores the
potential value of insurance as a complement to, or substitute for, the
State. 18 There is an increasing interest in the regulatory potential of
insurance companies both in academic literature as well as at the policy
level.
A considerable amount of literature has been devoted to discussing
regulation by insurance. As far back as 1986, Reichman explored insurance
as a social control tool to regulate crime risk.19 More recently, Abraham
offered an overview and critique of modern conceptions of insurance based
on the debates about insurance and insurance law in recent decades; one

17

There are many possible ways to describe insurance regulation. For
example, the function of insurance regulation describes seven main
functional divisions: licensing, taxation, solvency, rates, forms, access and
availability, and market conduct; theoretical justifications of insurance
regulation present information problems, externalities, opportunism and
egalitarian or distributional objectives to justify regulation. See TOM
BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY: CASES
MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 573–580 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).
18
Some scholars prefer the term “governance by insurance.” In this
Article, governance by insurance is interchangeable with the term
“regulation by insurance.”
19
Nancy Reichman, Managing Crime Risks: Toward an Insurance
Based Model of Social Control, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW, DEVIANCE AND
SOCIAL CONTROL 151–172 (Andrew T. Scull & Stephen Spitzer eds.,
1986).
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such conception is that of “insurance as governance,” which corresponds to
the idea of regulation by insurance.20
In 2002, Heimer discussed the cost and benefit of private regulation
through insurance. 21 In 2003, Ericson, Doyle, and Barry adopted a
sociological perspective to explore insurance as governance, and
documented how the insurance industry governs our lives and asserts
insurance governing through nine interconnected dimensions.22 In 2004,
Ericson and Doyle further applied their theoretical framework to four sets
of risks that are governed by insurance: life, disability, earthquakes, and
terrorism.23 They invented a new term for the insurance approach to natural
catastrophe risk, “absorbing risk”, which requires creating an infrastructure
that can withstand the shock of a catastrophe.24 Consistent with the concept
of absorbing risk, Baker urged the reconsideration of assessment
approaches to catastrophe insurance to allow insurance institutions to
manage the uncertainties of catastrophe risk.25
In 2005, Baker and Farrish initiated the discussion of the technique
of firearms regulation by liability insurance. 26 With gun violence
20

Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 653 (2013); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as
Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489
(2009) (His argument seems to fit comfortably within the “insurance as
governance” conception).
21
Carol Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and Benefits
of Private Regulation through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: THE
CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 116-145 (Tom
Baker & Jonathan Simon eds. 2002).
22
See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE, & DEAN
BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003).
23
See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN
BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (U. Toronto
Press 2004).
24
Id.
25
See generally Tom Baker, Embracing Risk, Sharing Responsibility,
56 DRAKE L. REV. 561 (2007).
26
Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the
Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 292-314 (Timothy D.
Lytton ed., 2005).
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dominating the headlines during the last several years, Kochenburger has
argued that regulation by liability insurance could serve as a potentially
valuable tool to address and reduce gun violence27 while Mocsary contends
that the insurance regime is unlikely to attain this goal.28 Besides gun
violence, Yin, Kunreuther, and White have examined how environmental
liability insurance can reduce environmental accidents based on
disaggregated (facility-level) data.29 Ben-Shahar and Logue have
additionally explored regulation by insurance as a substitute for
government regulation of safety in areas of products liability, workers’
compensation, auto, homeowners, environmental liability and tax liability,
and expand to yet unutilized areas, such as consumer protection, food
safety, and financial statements.30 In 2003, Baker and Swedloff
summarized regulation by liability insurance, and drew upon prior
literature to examine four areas of liability and corresponding insurance—
shareholder liability, automobile liability, gun liability, and medical
professional liability—and developed a conceptual framework to guide
qualitative research for lawyers’ professional liability.31
In 2015, Talesh significantly widened the scope of regulation by
insurance through the study of Employment Practices Liability Insurance
(“EPLI”), explaining how insurance practices have transformed the moral
logic of anti-discrimination law into the risk management logic of EPLI loss
prevention advice. This study demonstrated how regulation by insurance
does not simply consist of assessing how well liability insurance delivers a
legal deterrence signal, but rather how it transforms that signal into loss

Peter Kochenburger, Liability Insurance and Gun Violence, 46
CONN. L. REV. 1265, 1269-70 (2014).
28
George Mocsary, Insuring Against Guns?, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1209,
1212-13 (2014).
29
Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew W. White, Risk-Based
Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market
Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 325 (2011).
30
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4.
31
Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance:
From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412
(2013).
27
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prevention.32 It is not only insurers that play a role as private regulators;
recently it was stressed that reinsurance companies can also act as “silent
regulators”,33 particularly in exercising a regulatory influence on insurers.34
As we will show below, in the latter case there are often also hybrid
constructions since catastrophe insurance is frequently offered by
reinsurance pools in which the government equally participates.
B. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION BY CONTROLLING MORAL HAZARD
These regulatory effects of insurance that have just been described
generally can also be found in the area of catastrophe insurance. The danger
of moral hazard can obviously also arise in the case of catastrophe
insurance. As a result, insurers will exercise control on the behavior of the
insured to remedy moral hazard. It is precisely that control that will also, in
the field of catastrophes, provide effective incentives for disaster risk
reduction. This has been well documented. Kunreuther and his colleagues at
the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center have argued
that insurance can be structured to improve the incentive to protect oneself
against flood and hurricane damage. To achieve this goal, they proposed the
idea of multi-year insurance contracts with risk-based premiums that could
enable insurers to offer lower premiums for properties where measures have
been taken to reduce risk.35 As for climate-related extremes, Telesetsky has
32

See generally Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance
Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 37 U. DENVER L. & POL’Y 209 (2015).
33
Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN.
INS. L.J. 345, 348-49 (2009).
34
See generally Marcos Antonio Mendoza, Reinsurance as
Governance: Governmental Risk Management Pools as a Study in the
Governance Role Played by Reinsurance Institutions, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 53
(2014).
35
See generally Howard Kunreuther, The Role of Insurance in
Reducing Losses from Extreme Events: The Need for Public-Private
Partnerships, 40 THE GENEVA PAPERS 741 (2015); Howard Kunreuther &
Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through Redesigned
Insurance: Challenges and Opportunities, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE,
1-40 (G. Dionne. ed. 2012); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insuring
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posited that third-party insurance that follows the polluter that pays
principle could compel timely climate change mitigation on the part of
major greenhouse gas emitters. 36 Telesetsky has also explored how
mandatory climate change catastrophe insurance can serve the goals of both
corrective and distributive justice. Furthermore, Faure and Bruggeman,
from the perspective of compensation, have documented how first-party
insurance can constitute a viable alternative to government compensation
while victims can also benefit from preventative incentives.37
Empirical evidence supports this literature. An empirical study of
catastrophe insurance markets in Germany and the U.S. utilizing field
survey data, suggests the opposite of a moral hazard effect.38 This study
responds to the theoretical hypothesis that recognizes that insurers have the
capacity and means to manage moral hazard.39 The findings from Germany
conclude that “individuals with flood insurance are more likely to have
undertaken one of the suggested flood coping measures than uninsured
households”.40 This conclusion is supported by the evidence from the U.S.,
Against Catastrophes, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN AND THE
UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, 210–238 (F. X.
Diebold, N. Doherty and R. Herring, eds., 2010).
36
See generally Anastasia Telesetsky, Insurance as a Mitigation
Mechanism: Managing International Greenhouse Gas Emissions through
Nationwide Mandatory Climate Change Catastrophe Insurance, 27 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 691 (2010).
37
See generally Michael G. Faure, Insurability of Damage Caused by
Climate Change: A Commentary, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1875 (2007); Michael
Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2008).
38
See generally Paul Hudson et al., Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster
Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United
States, 93 LAND ECON. 179, 179-208 (2017) (They conducted a
comprehensive empirical study of risk selection in natural disaster
insurance markets and asked whether disaster preparedness activities differ
when people have natural disaster coverage. The statistical analyses are
based on survey data of individual disaster insurance purchases and risk
mitigation activities in Germany and the United States).
39
See generally Shavell, supra note 5; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra
note 4.
40
See Hudson et al., supra note 38, at 181 ("Our analysis found that
households with flood insurance suffer larger losses than uninsured
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which shows that households who are more likely to have flood insurance
and homeowners policies that cover wind damage, engage in more ex ante
property risk reduction behavior on hurricane preparedness. 41 This is
equally evident in Switzerland where a public monopoly insurance exists
with mandatory participation that has been shown to incentivize risk
reduction.42
There is an interesting cooperation between the State and insurers.
Catastrophe risk may result in significant human and financial losses, and is
therefore an issue that the State must address. The State reaches out to the
insurance industry to regulate and absorb some of the catastrophe risk.
Additionally, the State needs the cooperation of the insurance industry
because of the low-frequency but high-impact nature of catastrophe risk,
and the complexity of establishing affordable and sustainable management
and compensation arrangements. 43 Moreover, the State often creates a
regulatory vacuum by refusing to take up contentious questions in which
activities related to catastrophe risk should be encouraged, permitted, or
proscribed.44 The insurance industry can address the problems caused by
catastrophe risk and fill the regulatory vacuum by providing the technical
apparatus needed for risk reduction and loss compensation.45 In turn the
State cooperates with the insurance industry for catastrophe losses of which
the expected damage may exceed amounts that could be insured on normal
households due to their higher hazard level rather than due to moral hazard,
which to the best of our knowledge has not been shown before.").
41
Hudson et al., supra note 38.
42
Paul Raschky et al., Alternative Financing and Insurance Solutions
for Natural Hazards: A Comparison of Different Risk Transfer Systems in
Three Countries – Germany, Austria and Switzerland – Affected by the
August 2005 Floods, RESEARCHGATE, 13-14, 17 (2009); Gebhard
Kirchgässner, On the Efficiency of a Public Insurance Monopoly: The Case
of Housing Insurance in Switzerland, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
CHOICE 221–226 (Baake P & Bork R eds., 2007).
43
See generally Youbaraj Paudel, A Comparative Study of
Public—Private Catastrophe Insurance Systems: Lessons from Current
Practices, 37 THE GENEVA PAPERS 257 (2012).
44
See generally Heimer, supra note 21.
45
See generally Tom Baker, Insurance in Sociolegal Research, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433 (2010).
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insurance and reinsurance markets. In that case the State provides
compensation of an upper layer as a reinsurer of last resort.46 In many legal
systems there are various mutual dependencies between the state and the
insurance industry in protecting against natural disasters. On the one hand
the State depends upon the insurance industry to provide primary cover and
to provide incentives for disaster risk reduction. Insurers on the other hand
rely on primary investments by the state in disaster risk reduction (for
example building dikes and levees) and regulating disaster risk reduction.
Insurers also depend upon the state as a reinsurer of last resort to provide an
upper layer of cover.47 Moreover, in some cases reinsurance is provided by
pools which have a hybrid character as they consist of both reinsurers and
the government.48 Two interesting questions arise in that respect. The first
question relates to the precise technical tools used by insurers to provide
incentives for disaster risk reduction. The second question asks whether the
government equally plays a role (in interaction with insurers) in providing
those incentives for disaster risk reduction. Those questions will be the
subject of the next section.

46
See generally Johanna Hjalmarsson & Mateusz Bek, Legislative and
Regulatory Methodology and Approach: Developing Catastrophe
Insurance in China, in INSURANCE LAW IN CHINA (Johanna Hjalmarsson &
Dingjing Huang eds., 2015); Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer et al, Insurance
against Losses from Natural Disasters in Developing Countries: Evidence,
Gaps and the Way Forward, 1 J. INTEGRATED DISASTER RISK MGMT. 59
(2011); Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure and Karine Fiore, The
Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA PAPERS
369–390 (2010).
47
See generally Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias
Heldt, Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of
Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 185 (2012).
48
See Mendoza, supra note 34.
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REGULATORY TECHNIQUES OF CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE

As a private regulator, insurance operates stealthily by using
technical tools to reduce moral hazard.49 As indicated these instruments to
control moral hazard consist on the one hand of techniques to control the
behavior of the insured via adapted policy conditions and on the other hand
in partially exposing the insured to risk. 50 In some of the literature
previously discussed a further refinement of the regulatory techniques of
insurance has been made leading to the following taxonomy. 51 These
technical tools, which almost all insurers use to one degree or another,
include risk-based pricing, contract design (e.g. limits, deductibles,
copayments, and exclusions), loss prevention, claim management, and
refusal to insure. Of course, not all of those technical tools will be used by
catastrophe insurers to the same extent. However, this taxonomy provides a
good categorization of the types of technical tools usually employed in
catastrophe insurance to control moral hazard.
A. RISK-BASED PRICING
Risk-based pricing is considered to be the most basic technique for
creating incentives to reduce risk. 52 Insurers set premiums to reflect
underlying risk levels in order to provide individuals incentives to mitigate
losses. 53 Indeed, insurers often adopt feature ratings 54 and experience
49

Heimer, supra note 21.
Shavell, supra note 5.
51
Baker & Farrish, supra note 26; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 31;
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4; Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made
Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 541
(2009).
52
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4.
53
Peter Molk, Private Versus Public Insurance for Natural Hazards:
Individual Behavior’s Role in Loss Mitigation, in RISK ANALYSIS OF
NATURAL HAZARDS 265-277 (Paolo Gardoni et al. eds., 2015).
54
Feature rating means insurers examine the insured's individual risk
characteristics and adjust premiums accordingly; experience rating means
50

202

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 24.2

ratings in order to signal premium loss prevention. Charging lower
premiums to careful policyholders induces them to reduce exposure to
claims in order to avoid higher premiums in the future. 55 For example,
environmental liability policies reward policyholders with premium
discounts if they take loss prevention measures, such as replacing fuel tanks
constructed of corrosion-prone material; by contrast, the premium will be
raised by ten to twenty percent due to a prior leak of the fuel tank. 56
Risk-based pricing is therefore quite a straightforward tool to reduce moral
hazard.
In the field of catastrophe insurance, risk-based premiums enable
insurers to provide discount to residents adopting cost-effective mitigation
measures, and thus provide a clear signal to those currently residing in
hazard-prone areas. 57 It also urges homeowners who plan to settle in
hazard-prone areas to reconsider their choice of location and to reduce their
vulnerability to catastrophes.58 Such regulation may not work if insurance
premiums are not risk-based. Furthermore for insurers, risk-based pricing
not only assures adequate returns to investors, but also helps guarantee
solvency when catastrophes happen. 59 The relationship with public
regulation is clear: to the extent that public regulation would prevent
insurers from charging risk-based premiums this tool aiming at disaster risk
reduction could not be employed in an optimal manner.

insurers gather information about the insured's loss experience during the
course of the policy period and use that information either to make
retroactive pricing adjustments or prospective pricing adjustments for
future policy periods. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4 at 206.
55
Baker & Swedloff, supra note 31, at 1419.
56
See Yin, Kunreuther & White, supra note 29.
57
Howard Kunreuther, Professor, Univ. of Pa., Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Tax and Capital Access of the House
Small Business Committee: Oversight of the SBA’s Disaster Assistance
Program and Examining Changes Proposed by H.R. 3042 – The Disaster
Loan Fairness Act of 2011, (Feb. 16, 2012), http://smallbusiness.house.gov
/uploadedfiles/kunreuther_testimony.pdf.
58
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 35.
59
Id.
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B. CONTRACT DESIGN
Contract design can also be used to regulate risk both directly and
indirectly, by including such elements as deductibles, copayments,
coverage amount limits, and exclusions. Deductibles and copayments can
mitigate moral hazard directly by preventing policyholders from shielding
themselves entirely from loss.60 This is one of the tools to control moral
hazard: exposing the insured partially to risk will provide incentives for
adequate prevention to the insured. If indeed a portion of the risk remains
with the insured, they will exercise greater vigilance.61 Exclusions can be
seen as an indirect way to regulate policyholders, as it excludes certain
types of risk or claims from coverage. For example, intentional harm is
commonly excluded from liability insurance policies; environmental
claims, too, are often excluded from general liability insurance (“CGL”)
policies. Deductibles are, moreover, a good technique to remedy adverse
selection: good risks can signal their lower exposure to risk by choosing a
higher deductible.
Furthermore, using the tools of contract design places a lower
burden of information on insurers than when using risk-based pricing. It
may also be comparatively efficient in attracting insureds to adopt cheap
measures of risk mitigation. 62 Again, from a regulatory perspective the
ability of insurers to incentivize disaster risk reduction via an optimal
contract design may be jeopardized as a result of public regulation (e.g.
limiting the amount of the deductible).

60

“Deductibles require insureds to pay a fixed amount ‘out of pocket’
to cover insured losses before the insurance coverage kicks in to cover
insured losses thereafter. Copayments typically require insureds to bear
some fraction of each covered loss claim filed by an insured”. See
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4 at 209 n.30.; see also Baker & Swedloff,
supra note 31 at 1429-30.
61
Id. at 1420.
62
See generally Ronen Avraham, The Law and Economics of
Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29 (2012).
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C. LOSS PREVENTION
Providing loss prevention services is an obvious form of regulation,
because it permits insurers to advise policyholders on how to modify their
behavior in order to mitigate and avoid losses. 63 In other words, loss
prevention services can serve as ex ante regulation by insurance. Insurers
have an advantage over policyholders in identifying the best ways to
mitigate risk and avoid losses, because they are able to collect more data on
claims and harms. Insurers, therefore, will eventually benefit from loss
prevention services because they have to pay for the loss based on the
policy. Additionally, active engagement in loss prevention will enable
insurers to identify insureds with lower than average moral hazard and
underwrite “good” risks.
Insurers can promote loss prevention in a variety of ways, all of
which are potentially applicable to catastrophe insurance.64 Insurers may
monitor the insureds through loss prevention during the course of the
insurance relationship;65 they may conduct research and disseminate new
loss-prevention methods;66 they may cooperate with the State, and promote
the legislation of loss prevention laws and regulations;67 lastly, insurers
may establish underwriting procedures that make loss prevention activities
a precondition to obtaining insurance.68

63

See generally Baker & Swedloff, supra note 31.
George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss
Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN.
INS. L.J. 305 (1997); Baker & Farrish, supra note 26.
65
For example, in the auto insurance context, insurers monitor the
insureds’ repair service to mitigate loss.
66
For example, the homeowners’ insurance industry has its own
association (The Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety)
researching and promulgating various ways of making commercial
properties and homes safer from all sorts of hazards.
67
For example, insurers attempt to upgrade and enhance the content
and enforcement of state and local building codes.
68
For example, most insurance policies require the insureds to take all
reasonable post-accident activities to mitigate losses or else forfeit
coverage. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, The
64
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Hurricane Andrew changed the manner in which insurers use
prevention loss services in catastrophe insurance. Before that event,
insurers did not promote loss prevention services because they thought
these services would prevent them from raising premiums and increasing
their profits. 69 After Hurricane Andrew, the situation has changed, and
insurers have taken a new approach to loss prevention services as they now
feel that they have the potential to initiate fundamental behavioral change
among the insureds. Hurricane Andrew has led insurers to engage with laws
and regulations, as it was understood that the loss of houses incurred by
disasters is due largely to lack of enforcement of building codes. 70
Consequently, the Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction (now the
Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety) was established to
promote building code inspections and enforcement, and to initiate a Code
Effectiveness Grading Schedule, which uses the Fire Suppression Rating
Program as a prototype. 71 The insurers’ approach has changed from a
financial point of view as well, because they have to demand high
premiums in order to underwrite highly risky activities which will lead
them to a disadvantaged position in the market.72
Some public-private partnership catastrophe insurance programs
expand loss prevention services by providing information on the benefits of
risk mitigation to insureds. The legislation for both the Florida Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund and the California Earthquake Authority, for example,
demands of insurers to promote loss prevention services among their
clienteles.73

Insurer’s Duty to Pay Proceeds, in UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 637
(4th ed. 2007).
69
See generally Robert Hunter, Insuring Against Natural Disaster, 12
J. OF INS. REG. 467 (1994).
70
See Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through
Insurance, 12 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 171 (1996).
71
Id.
72
Telesetsky, supra note 36.
73
DWIGHT JAFFEE, Catastrophe Insurance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW, 160–89 (Daniel Schwarcz &
Peter Siegelman. eds., 2015).
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In the context of climate change, insurers have worked in tandem
with scientists to identify technical and economic parameters of catastrophe
risk and develop system-wide technologies of loss prevention. 74 In
addition, in order to realize the goal of loss prevention, insurers offer low
premiums for low emissions operators as an incentive to adopt certain
technologies and gradually reduce their emission.75
D. CLAIM MANAGEMENT
In addition to ex ante regulation, insurers also conduct ex post
regulation through claim management. Generally speaking, policyholders
often lack control over the cost of a claim, leaving its management in the
hands of the insurers.76 Different lines of insurers operate different types of
claim management. Liability insurers, due to their right and duty to defend
and settle, can directly regulate the litigation process and thus mitigate ex
post moral hazard. Because of their involvement in claim management and
litigation, they can further apply such information in pricing, contract
design, and loss prevention services. In workers’ compensation insurance,
since the employer bears the actual risk, insurers are only providing claims
administration services based on their expertise in verifying, quantifying,
and managing the claims and payments.77
In the case of catastrophe risks, the policyholders’ inability to
change the possibility of a natural disaster, alongside their ability to
mitigate disaster losses, make claim management quite necessary to control
ex post moral hazard. Catastrophe insurers, therefore, may employ an
adjuster to investigate claimed losses, measure them, and negotiate payouts.
Then they can review the adjuster’s decisions and provide greater
uniformity and predictability.
74
Peter A. Stott et. al, Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of
2003, 432 NATURE 610 (2004), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature03089.
75
See Telesetsky, supra note 36.
76
Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers:
From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 107 (1997).
77
Ben Sahar & Logue, supra note 4, at 213-14.
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E. REFUSAL TO INSURE
The final technical tool used by insurers to regulate their insured is
the refusal to insure. A refusal to provide insurance is especially important
when the availability of insurance has been made a precondition to exercise
a particular activity. There can be an obligation to take out insurance either
based on regulation (mandatory insurance) or based on contract. An
example of the latter constitutes homeowners insurance in the U.S. Before
the mortgage contract is concluded, the mortgagor is required to obtain
homeowners insurance or to relegate to the mortgagee to acquire such
insurance.78 In this case, and presuming catastrophe insurance is mandatory
in hazard-prone areas, the insurers’ refusal to insure may have de facto
control over the insureds, and may induce less risky behavior. A refusal to
insure is of course more complex in systems, such as in France,79 where the
purchase of disaster coverage is mandatory, or at least a mandatory
complement to a voluntary homeowners insurance. In that case insurers are
often forced by regulation to provide the coverage and refusal to insure is no
longer an option.
Declining to renew a policy is another form of refusal to insure and
can be equally effective. After the insured has conducted risky activities or
failed to take mitigation measures, the insurers can cancel, rescind, or refuse
to renew the existing policy. 80 The threat of non-renewal could push
homeowners to undertake mitigations.

78

Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural
Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 197 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006).
79
See infra Part IV, Section C.
80
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4, at 209.
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The regulatory techniques of the insurance industry identified in
the last section are already put into effect in various countries. This section
will review specific types of catastrophe insurance in five jurisdictions. We
first address private flood insurance in the U.K. This was, until recently,
considered as one of only a handful of successful cases of catastrophe
insurance in the world. The second case relates to the National Flood
Insurance Program (“NFIP”) in the U.S., a system which has been seriously
criticized in the literature for providing inadequate incentives for
prevention. The third system is the Catastrophes Naturelles (“Cat.Nat”)
insurance system in France. This provides an interesting model of a
mandatory add-on for catastrophe risks, complementary to voluntary
housing insurance. Such a model has been followed by many other
countries in the world. The fourth system we address is the regulation
through the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Scheme (“JER”). This
scheme is remarkable as it is voluntary for policyholders, but mandatory for
insurers. The fifth example constitutes the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance
Pool (“TCIP”). This is “considered as a good example of catastrophe risk
insurance for developing and middle-income countries”.81
As these examples will demonstrate, there is wide variation in the
nature and extent of regulation through catastrophe insurance across
different countries. For each country we will first sketch the availability of
catastrophe insurance and whether there is influence projected through
public regulation. Subsequent, we will examine to what extent the technical
tools we discussed in the previous section (risk-based pricing, contract
design, loss prevention, claim management or refusal to insure) can and are
used in practice.

81

EUGENE GURENKO ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, EARTHQUAKE
INSURANCE IN TURKEY: HISTORY OF THE TURKISH CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE POOL, xiv (2006).
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A. UNITED KINGDOM
In the United Kingdom, natural catastrophe risk coverage is
included among the basic guarantees in commercial and household policies.
Many households, for example, are in effect covered against flood damage,
which is usually included in homeowners’ insurance policies because
mortgage lenders require that a property have full insurance coverage.82
The flood insurance scheme emerged in 1961. 83 According to a
gentlemen’s agreement 84 that divided the rights and duties between the
State and the insurance industry, insurers regulate policyholders and
compensate victims in the case of flood damage, while the State sets rules
and codes for flood protection, flood warning and land use, and guarantees
the independence of insurers’ operation.85 The distinguishing feature of the
U.K.’s catastrophe insurance scheme was that the State did not intervene in
either direct insurance or reinsurance. This UK model was based on a close
collaboration between the state and private insurers whereby the private
insurers agreed to generously provide insurance coverage and the state
committed to invest in flood protection prevention measures. For a long
time this UK private flood insurance scheme was considered as a model,
showing how a largely private insurance could work in an efficient and
sustainable manner. 86 However, recent large floods have fundamentally
challenged these mechanisms as it was held (by insurers and by the public
opinion) that the state did not sufficiently invest in flood protection
82

Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National
Flood Insurance Program, 24 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 165, 183 (2010).
83
Michael Huber, Insurability and Regulatory Reform: Is the English
Flood Insurance Regime Able to Adopts to Climate Change?, 29 GENEVA
PAPER ON RISK AND INS. ISSUES AND PRAC. 169, 172 (2004).
84
According to a gentlemen’s agreement between the British
government and private insurers, the insurers undertook to offer flood
coverage to owners of houses and organizations. See Michael Huber,
Reforming the UK Flood Insurance Regime: The Breakdown of a
Gentlemen's Agreement, in 18 CARR DISCUSSION PAPERS 1, 4 (Centre for
Analysis of Risk and Regulation, 2014).
85
Huber, supra note 83, at 172.
86
Id. at 174-75.
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measures and therefore was not meeting its part of the deal. These recent
developments fundamentally challenged the stability of the system as
insurers have even threatened cancelling the gentlemen’s agreement.87
In 2013, the State and the insurance industry agreed to a
Memorandum of Understanding known as Flood Re.88 Flood Re, finds its
basis in the U.K. Government Water Act of 2014. Flood Re, a not-for-profit
reinsurance fund owned and managed by private insurers, is designed to
ensure regulation by flood insurance and keep it widely available and
affordable. It is estimated that 300,000–500,000 high flood-risk households
would struggle to obtain affordable flood insurance without Flood Re.89
The Water Act of 2014 was launched on April 4, 2016. It contains detailed
provisions related to the structure and working of the flood insurance
scheme. Primary insurers sell a homeowners’ insurance policy with flood
coverage to households in the usual way and then pass the flood risk to
Flood Re, which pays the insurers if flood claims are made.90 The scheme
ensures regulation by flood insurance because the claim still rests with the
primary insurers, but are backed up by Flood Re. The Flood Re fund has
two sources of income: one is the flood element premium of the home
insurance policies, and the other is an additional levy on the insurance
industry.91 However, in an extreme situation—for example, a year with

87

Hjalmarsson & Bek, supra note 46, at 197.
The Flood Re model is loosely based on Pool Re, a reinsurance
scheme for terrorism risks formed in 1993 in response to the threat posed by
the Irish Republican Army and other terrorist activity. See id.
89
The Future of Flood Insurance: What Happens Next?, ASSOCIATION
OF BRITISH INSURERS (2015), https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-andsavings/Topics-and-issues/Flooding/Government-and-insurance-industry-f
lood-agreement/The-future-of-flood-insurance.
90
Flood Re Explained, ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS (2015),
https://www.abi.org.uk/products-and-issues/topics-and-issues/flood-re/flo
od-re-explained/.
91
Government and Insurance Industry Flood Agreement (Statement of
Principles),
ASSOCIATION
OF
BRITISH
INSURERS
(2014),
https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Topics-and-issues/Flooding
/Government-and-insurance-industry-flood-agreement.
88
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damage figures six times worse than 2007—the government will take
primary responsibility, and work with both the insurers and Flood Re.92
Risk-Based Pricing. Initially, the premiums were undifferentiated
across all households, and yet, as time went by, insurers improved their
knowledge through accurate flood maps and took the real risks into account.
This is important since premiums of flood insurance are risk-based, not flat,
and are set on a case-by-case basis. 93 In 2001, for example, heavy
premiums were required for properties where flood claims had been
previously made. 94 Furthermore, for households located in flood-prone
areas, premiums have increased significantly during the last few years.95
Insurers in the U.K. can, and prefer to, conduct risk-based pricing
of flood insurance, because; 1) the State lacks control over the rate-setting
as per the gentlemen’s agreement;96 2) it helps control moral hazard, and
“bad” risks are sorted out more rigorously; and, 3) it may provide incentives
to policyholders to mitigate flood risks.97 Flood Re is also criticized since
high risk houses will de facto be subsidized through a levy which will have
to be paid by all domestic property owners.98
92

Id.
Michael Huber & Tola Amodu, United Kingdom, in FINANCIAL
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL APPROACH 261, 291 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006).
94
David Crichton, UK and Global Insurance Responses to Flood
Hazard, 27 WATER INT’L 119, 122 (2002).
95
See Jessica E. Lamond et al., Accessibility of Flood Risk Insurance in
the U.K.: Confusion, Competition and Complacency, 12 J. OF RISK RES.
825 (2009).
96
But the insurers also “agreed that the additional premium rate would
not exceed 0.5 percent on the sum insured”. See Crichton, supra note 94, at
127. What is more, according to the agreement between insurers and the
government to develop the nonprofit company Flood Re, insurers will
charge high-risk household a premium that will be capped depending on the
property’s Council Tax band. See ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS,
supra note 90.
97
Swenja Surminski, The Role of Flood Insurance in Reducing Direct
Risk (2015), reprinted in FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF CONSUMER FLOOD INS.
IN THE UK 15-25 (Johanna Hjalmarsson ed., 2015).
98
James Davey, Flood Re: Risk Classification and Distortion of the
Market (2015), reprinted in FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF CONSUMER FLOOD
INS. IN THE UK 20, 26 (Johanna Hjalmarsson ed., 2015).
93
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Contract Design. Deductibles are applied to some or all
indemnification, depending on the type of damage and its cause. This
follows the model provided by building insurance and content insurance,
which cover not just ordinary perils like fire, but also earthquakes, floods
and other catastrophe risks.99 Individual policy deductibles per 105 IV is
1% (between 78 and 156 on average, but could reach up to 2,333). 100
Exclusions are also utilized in Flood Re, as homes built after January 1,
2009, will not be covered if they would be constructed in known high
flood-risk areas (as applied under the old Flood Insurance Statement of
Principles). 101 Such an arrangement offers real-estate developers the
incentives to avoid construction in known high flood-risk areas.
Loss Prevention. Insurers promote loss prevention in a variety of
ways. First, insurers actively engage with government regulation. In 2007,
the Association of British Insurers (“ABI”) demanded more government
involvement in flood risk reduction, the approval of new compulsory
building codes, and the development of long-term (twenty-five years)
preventive strategy plans.102 Recently, the State has created the Planning
Policy Statement (“PPS”) 25 in collaboration with insurers, which
proscribes land-use planning and flood damage reduction.103 Additionally,
insurers conduct catastrophe risk research. At least twelve major insurers
invest substantial sums in research aimed at producing more accurate flood
maps. Although such research is expensive, these maps, which are better
than the UK government or its agencies have been able to afford so far, will
assist insurers to underwrite, and lead to more accurate pricing.104

99
WORLD FORUM OF CATASTROPHE PROGRAMMES, NATURAL
CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER: A DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS (2008).
100
The amounts for Individual policy deductibles per 105 IV and
Premium levels are assessed on the basis of maximum damage (i.e., in case
a house is completely destroyed). See Paudel, supra note 43, at 264.
101
See ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS, supra note 89.
102
Summer Floods 2007: Learning the Lessons, ASSOCIATION OF
BRITISH INSURERS, Nov. 2007, at 6.
103
Huber, supra note 83, at 173.
104
Crichton, supra note 94, at 122.
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Claim Management. Under the private insurance scheme, claims
are made via the insurance company, and are established in the individual
insurance contract. Because data gathering is focused on claim histories,
and experience rating is applied in risk-based pricing, claim management
helps control moral hazard.
Refusal to Insure. Individuals and organizations have a de facto
obligation to buy flood coverage if they would like to secure a mortgage,
because all homeowners wishing to secure a mortgage must purchase flood
insurance.105 If the properties lack insurance coverage, they may decrease
in value to the point where they are no longer marketable. 106 Such
quasi-mandatory arrangement makes the insureds take more than normal
precautions. Therefore, insurers’ refusal to insure will all but control the
insureds’ activities, and thus they can use this power to induce less risky
behavior. As mentioned above, a consequence of the gentlemen’s
agreement is that private insurers in principle undertake to offer flood
coverage to owners of houses and organizations.107 That, however, does not
imply an unconditional commitment to provide cover for any risk.
Furthermore, insurers may refuse to renew flood policies, and
negotiate with the government to undertake stronger protection measures.
Indeed, ABI once warned the government to take firmer action on flood
defense; otherwise the insurance industry would not be able to provide
flood coverage. 108 This conflict between the government and the UK
insurers has come to a head in recent years. Many floods occurred, and
many claims were made on the insurers. The latter claimed that the large
losses due to the floods were related to the lacking investments by the
government in flood prevention. Insurers therefore held that the UK
government did not comply with its obligations under the gentlemen’s
agreement (to invest in public facilities aiming at flood prevention). Due to
this, insurers therefore desired to cancel the gentlemen’s agreement. If
105
106
107
108

Huber, supra note 83, at 6.
Huber, supra note 84, at 180.
Huber, supra note 83.
Crichton, supra note 94, at 129.
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insurers are entitled to withdraw from the market, the problems of
catastrophe risk will eventually be left for the State and society to resolve.
B. THE UNITED STATES
The United States is often seen as an insurance-based society,
whereby there are strong interdependencies between the government and
the insurance industry. 109 This government involvement can also be
observed in the coverage of catastrophe risk. In that respect, three distinct
models of collaboration between the government and the insurance sector
can be distinguished.110 In a first model, private insurers are the principal
guarantors against risk, and the government has only limited involvement.
The Price-Anderson Act, concerning nuclear facilities, is an example of this
model. 111 Under this model, the Price-Anderson Act mandated the
purchase of insurance but since 1975 there is no longer government
involvement in the compensation. A first layer is paid by the liability
insurer of the operator where the accident occurred; the second layer is
provided through a collective payment by all nuclear operators active in the
market through retroactive premiums collected by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC”). The NRC manages the collection of the
retrospective premiums, but the financial risk is born by the nuclear
operators.112 In a second model, insurers provide the primary coverage for
the risk while the State supplies the reinsurance coverage. The Federal
109

Baker & Farrish, supra note 26, at 292.
See generally Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States,
in Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophe: A Comparative
Legal Approach 324 (M. Faure & T. Hartlief eds. 2006).
111
See 42 U.S.C. 2210 (1988 & Supp. 1992). “Today, the individual
liability of a nuclear operator is $375 million supplemented with a second
layer of retrospective premiums of $11.86 billion, leading to a total amount
of $12.2 billion without any government intervention.” See Liu Jing &
Michael Faure, Compensating Nuclear Damage in China, 11 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 781, 813(2012).
112
Michael Faure &Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear
Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International
Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 219, 240-247
(2008).
110
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Terrorism Risk Program illustrates this model. 113 In the third model,
insurers do not assume risks, but only administer policy coverage for
government agencies. Earthquake insurance in California (“California
Earthquake Agency”) 114 and the National Flood Insurance Program
(“NFIP”) follow this model.115 This section will focus on the third model of
natural catastrophe risks.
The United States is vulnerable to numerous types of natural
catastrophes, and the risk of loss is increasing significantly.116 Standard
homeowners and commercial insurance policies normally cover
non-catastrophe damage, such as fire, wind, hail, and lightning; however,
flood damage resulting from rising water and earthquakes (in California) is
normally explicitly excluded from coverage.117 Flood insurance was first
offered by private insurers in the late 1890s, yet the financial loss was too
large for insurers, and they left the market.118The NFIP, administrated by
113

See Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 47 at 230-231.
The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) is a state-run privately
funded earthquake insurance program. Earthquake insurance can be
purchased for an additional premium in all states except California, where
today one normally buys an earthquake policy for residential damage
through the CEA. Id. at 224-225.
115
VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE
VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 415-432
(2010).
116
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Catastrophe
Insurance Risk: The Role of Risk-linked Securities and Factors Affecting
Their Use 8-11 GAO-02-941 (2002). According to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), an event where related federal costs reach
or exceed $500 million is deemed as “catastrophe.” See U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Experiences from Past
Disasters Offer Insights for Effective Collaboration after Catastrophe
Events 2 GAO-09-811 (2009). See also Michel-Kerjan, Erwann, Jeffrey
Czajkowski, and Howard Kunreuther, Could Flood Insurance be
Privatized in the United States? A Primer, 40 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON
RISK & INS.—ISSUES & PRAC. 179–208 (2015).
117
Seema Patel & Sarala Nagala, Public Policy Considerations of Water
Damage Exclusions in Hurricane Insurance Policies, 17-27,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/resources/disasters/Patel_Nagala.pdf.
118
HOWARD KUNREUTHER & RICHARD J. ROTH, SR., PAYING THE
PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL
DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 40(1998).
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), was established
according to the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, in order to assume
the flood risk and offer coverage.119 The Standard Flood Insurance Policy
of the NFIP covers direct physical losses to structures and their contents
caused by flood.120 The NFIP has sold more than 5.2 million policies in
22,000 communities over the past 40 years, and provided almost $1.3
trillion in coverage. 121 Most of these policies are for single-family,
residential properties—such as those found in Florida—which comprise
nearly 40% of the NFIP (in number of policies, premiums and coverage).122
However, due to homeowners’ underestimation of the likelihood of flood
damages, the penetration rate of flood insurance is not very high. For
example, only 20% of those who suffered damage from Hurricane Sandy
had purchased NFIP policies.123
FEMA, in administrating the NFIP, works in conjunction with
private insurance companies through the Write Your Own (“WYO”)
program, which allows private insurers to issue policies in their own name,
to adjust flood claims, and to defend, settle or pay all claims arising from
the flood policies.124 Moreover, there is no reinsurance arrangement in the
NFIP, and if claims exceed its financial capacity, the federal government
provides a bailout. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the NFIP required
a bailout from the U.S. Treasury of close to $20 billion.125 Through these
cooperative efforts by the insurance industry and the government—where
119

But some private insurers still offer excess flood protection that
provides higher limits of coverage than the NFIP. See Well, B. Excess
Flood Market Steps up When National Flood Program Falls Short,
INSURANCE JOURNAL (24 Jul. 2006).
120
Rabin & Bratis, supra note 110.
121
Kunreuther, supra note 35.
122
Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, C. Come Rain or Shine:
Evidence on Flood Insurance Purchases in Florida, 77 J. OF RISK & INS.
369-397 (2010).
123
Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and
Devastating Natural Catastrophes in America, 60 VILL. L. REV. 53 (2015).
124
Véronique Bruggeman, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS:
A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 420 (2010); Rabin &
Bratis, supra note 110.
125
JAFFEE, supra note 73.
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private insurers make use of their marketing channels, risk management
expertise, and existing policy base, and the federal government works as the
ultimate risk taker—the NFIP enables homeowners to purchase flood
insurance.
Risk-Based Pricing. Premium setting in the NFIP is partially
risk-based. At the very beginning, the NFIP tried to adopt risk-based
premiums that differ per flood zone, but this proved to be difficult in
practice. Because the owners of buildings built before the creation of the
NFIP are reluctant to purchase policies providing higher coverage (and of
course having higher premiums), premiums are determined by applying the
Actuarial Rate Formula. The NFIP’s overall pricing strategy, however,
leads to important divergences from the true risk for a number of residents
covered by the program.126 In 2012, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance
Reform Act allowed insurers to eliminate certain premium subsidies and
increase the risk-based pricing. However, in 2014, this was prohibited by
the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act, which restored
grandfathering and limited certain rate increases.
According to the calculation of Michel-Kerjan et al., around a
quarter of the total NFIP policies are subsidized today. 127 Subsidized
premiums obviously do not reflect the accurate flood risk and represent on
average only 35%–50% of the actual risk. 128 Moreover, subsidized
structures are generally more prone to flooding, and are thus riskier than
other risk-based premiums structures.129
Contract Design. The NFIP provides deductibles, ranging between
$500 and $5000. Although a higher deductible lowers the premium and
encourages more mitigation measures, “97 percent of NFIP policy-holders
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See Michel-Kerjan, Czajkowski & Kunreuther, supra note 116.
Id.
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U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-118T, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY: ON-GOING CHALLENGES FACING
THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (2007).
129
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-127, FLOOD
INSURANCE: STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR
INVOLVEMENT (2014).
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choose deductible levels of $1000 or less”.130 The NFIP also uses coverage
limits. For example, a single-family dwelling is normally eligible for up to
$250,000 in building coverage and up to $100,000 in personal property
coverage.131
Loss Prevention. The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of
1994 creates mitigation insurance and develops a mitigation assistance
program for the NFIP. The NFIP integrates risk mitigation and prevention
measures, and it administers different kinds of mitigation programs. For
example, the NFIP tries to supply premium discounts to encourage
mitigation of risk. It operates the Community Rating System (“CRS”),
which rewards communities that undertake mitigating activities with
premiums discounts.132
Although the NFIP successfully reduced the vulnerability of new
buildings to floods, it had less impact on existing buildings and was also not
able to limit the development of flood-prone areas. 133 The increasing
federal disaster relief, moreover, may reduce an individual’s incentive to
prevent loss and contribute to this result. 134 There has been substantial
criticism on the payments made after Katrina arguing that they would
encourage people to rebuild in vulnerable areas.135 Some hold that the NFIP
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Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, supra note 122.
Rabin & Bratis, supra note 110, at 332.
132
See Hudson et al., supra note 38.
133
Raymond J. Burby, Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of
1927 and How It Changed America, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 337 (2000)
(book review).
134
The number of Presidential disaster declarations has significantly
increased over the past 50 years: namely, from 162 over the period
1955–1965 to 545 during 1996–2005. In response to Hurricane Katrina in
2005 and in the subsequent year, three emergency supplemental
appropriation bills of about $88.4 billion were enacted by Congress. This
total amount of federal relief is more than the combined total amounts of
private wind insurance claims and NFIP claims. See Erwann Michel-Kerjan
et al., Policy Tenure Under the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP), 32 RISK ANALYSIS 644, 644–658 (2012).
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William F. Shughart II, Katrinanomics: The Politics and Economics
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therefore provides incentives for property development in high-risk
areas.136
Claim Management. The NFIP uses insurers, because of their
claims handling expertise, to settle claims on its behalf. Yet the NFIP bears
further responsibility with regards to claim management, as the Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2004 stipulates that it should increase and improve
guidance for policyholders about the flood insurance claims process and
reduce the compensation to properties for which repetitive flood insurance
claim payments have been made. However, anecdotal evidence suggests
that because insurers do not assume underwriting risk in the NFIP, the
claims costs are higher than they would be under a private insurance
scheme.137
Refusal to Insure. This regulatory tool has little function in the
NFIP. Since insurers do not assume underwriting risk and receive an
expense allowance for policies written, they have no incentives to refuse to
insure. Instead, the NFIP tries every effort to attract individuals to subscribe
to the flood insurance policy. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973
mandates that lenders require flood insurance on loans secured by
properties that are located within high-risk flood areas.138 Moreover, the
National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 prevents federal agencies
from granting disaster aid in the Special Flood Hazard Areas (“SFHAs”) to
communities that had not joined the NFIP.139
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Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213
(2013); Andrew T. Young, Replacing Incomplete Markets with a Complete
Mess: Katrina and the NFIP, 35 IN’L J. SOC. ECON. 561, 566 (2008).
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supra note 94.
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Carolyn Kousky & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Examining Flood
Insurance Claims in the United States: Six Key Findings, 84 J. RISK & INS.
819-850 (2015).
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C. FRANCE
In France, catastrophe risks, such as floods and earthquakes, were
traditionally excluded from insurance coverage. However, after the 1981
floods in the Rhone, Saone and Garonne valleys, French legislators created
the famous Act of July 13, 1982, which establishes the Catastrophes
Naturelles System (“Cat.Nat”). 140 This system offers a unique
public-private partnership in regulating catastrophe risks. The division of
responsibilities between the insurers and the State according to the Cat.Nat
System compares well to some of the other systems discussed. The insurers
are responsible for underwriting policies, managing additional premiums,
adjusting damages, handling claims and paying indemnifications, while the
State is responsible for reinsurance and cooperating with insurers to create
prevention and mitigation plans.141 Article 1 of the Act of July 13, 1982
provides that property insurance policies that cover damage against
property are automatically and mandatorily insured against the risk of
natural disaster. 142 Although natural catastrophe disasters are “the
non-insurable direct material damage,” they must be insured in the Cat.Nat
System. 143 This mandatory requirement, coupled with its efficient
enforcement by the French authorities, brings the penetration rate of
catastrophe insurance to nearly 100%.144 In addition, the State will back
private insurers via reinsurance by the Caisse Centrale De Reassurance
(“CCR”) with unlimited State guarantee.145 This enables primary insurers
140

Act No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982 on the Indemnification of Victims
of Natural Catastrophes, JORF 14 (1982).
141
See Paudel, supra note 43, at 257-285.
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99.
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Michel-Kerjan, supra note 82.
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to underwrite catastrophe insurance policies at affordable prices for
homeowners.
Risk-Based Pricing. The Cat.Nat System adopts a flat rate rather
than risk-based premiums. It is the government that fixes the premiums
corresponding to the guarantee against the effects of natural catastrophes.
Under the influence of the national solidarity principle, Article 2 of the Act
of July 13, 1982 stipulates that “this guarantee is financed by an additional
premium calculated on the basis of a single rate set by Decree for each
category of insurance policy.” This additional premium for catastrophe
coverage is decided by the State in the form of a Ministerial Order, and
applied to each type of basic policies.146 Originally the initial rate was 5.5%
in 1982; it increased to 9% the following year and to 12% in 2000.147 As
this flat premium does not comply with the principle of risk-based pricing,
it in principle creates few incentives for policyholders to reduce risk.
Although the additional premium for the catastrophe coverage has been
regulated by statutes, there could still be some competition between
insurers. The competition would then not take place with respect to the
Cat.Nat cover (as premiums have been regulated) but with respect to the
basic premium for the housing insurance. Recall that the additional Cat.Nat
cover (for which an additional fixed premium is asked) is linked as a
complement to the voluntary housing insurance. If there were still
competition between insurers as far as the premium for the basic housing
insurance is concerned, insurers would have incentives for example to
provide lower premiums to insured who would have invested in disaster
risk reduction. Competition could thus stimulate investments in
prevention. 148 It is not so clear to what extent this really is the case;
moreover, even if there were such a competition it is unclear whether there
146

Id at 64.
MICHEL CANNARSA, ET AL., France, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 101
(M. Faure & T. Hartlief eds. 2006).
148
See generally Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Compulsory
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Solidarity? 29 World Competition 25 (2006).
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would be a reward for lower risks and hence a risk-differentiation. In 2006,
the French public authorities presented a draft amendment to the 1982 Act,
trying to abandon the unique extra insurance premium rate.149
Contract Design. There are mandatory and non-index-linked
deductibles fixed in the Act. Originally, the amount of deductibles differed
based on the type of risk—residential or commercial—but remained the
same for all perils (except subsidence, which has a higher specific
deductible). 150 The Decree of August 10, 1982; September 7, 1983;
September 19, 1983; and September 5, 2000, all insist on this rule.
However, in order to control moral hazard and encourage loss prevention
measures, a sliding scale has been introduced to vary these deductibles
since January 1, 2001.151 Exclusions are also used in the Cat.Nat System, as
the Act of July 13, 1982, stipulates that damage or costs indirectly due to the
disaster event are not covered.152
Loss Prevention. The Cat.Nat System integrates risk mitigation and
prevention measures. Insurers, moreover, cooperate with the State to
formulate risk prevention plans and form the Barnier mitigation fund.153
The amount of the deductible also depends on whether a particular
municipality has adopted a “prevention of risk plan” (plan de prevention
des risques). This fact should hence incentivize the local population to press
the municipality to adopt a prevention plan.154 However, recent empirical

149
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evidence shows that this system does not provide optimal incentives for
flood damage reduction. The deductibles’ adjustment policy does not seem
to provide incentives to communities to adopt a risk prevention plan in
practice.155
Claim Management. The Insurance Code specifies the legal
procedure of claim management. After government authorities declare a
“natural catastrophe” in the official gazette, the insureds must report their
damage to the insurers within ten days, with all relevant documentation
including a statement of all direct damage to property (indirect damages are
excluded), photos, videos etc.156 The timeframe of claim reporting is very
strict (except when suspended by force majeure), and non-compliance may
exclude the right to compensation.157 Setting a strict timeframe will press
the policyholders to act with due care and diligence after the catastrophe,
and allow insurers to send adjusters as soon as possible.
Refusal to Insure. Although the premiums are not risk-based,
insurers may not refuse to underwrite individuals’ catastrophe risk. When
insurers undertake the higher risk, they can reduce risk by purchasing the
relatively cheap reinsurance policies from the CCR, the only reinsurer with
an unlimited State guarantee.158

COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 199–218, 217
(Van Boom WH & Faure M eds., 2007).
155
“In terms of financing damage mitigation measures, since 2005, the
Fund for the Prevention of Major Natural Risks, also called the ‘Barnier’
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D. JAPAN
The current Japanese earthquake insurance system is a
public-private partnership between the government and the insurance
industry. The system is divided into two different regimes, one for business
and industry and the other for households.159 Business and industrial risks
are covered primarily by the private insurance market, while household
risks are covered by private insurers, but with strong government
involvement.160
The household earthquake insurance regime is based on the
Earthquake Insurance Act enacted in 1966, and offers coverage for not only
earthquake, but also tsunami and volcanic eruption perils.161 Insurers who
enroll in this scheme can offer direct coverage for earthquake damage as an
extension of the optional property and casualty insurance policy.
Individuals may choose to purchase earthquake insurance, yet it is
mandatory for insurers to supply it. The primary insurers cede 100% of the
underwritten earthquake insurance exposure to the Japanese Earthquake
Reinsurance Scheme (“JER”).162 Established by the Japanese government,
the JER is responsible for reinsurance of household earthquake insurance
through a state guarantee. 163 In other words, the Japanese government
works as a de facto reinsurer, because after primary insurers pay claims of
earthquake losses, they will be compensated by the government through the
JER.164
Because it is not mandatory for homeowners to purchase
earthquake insurance, its penetration ratio is not very high. For example, the
159

See generally Michael Faure & Liu Jing, The Tsunami of March
2011 and the Subsequent Nuclear Incident at Fukushima: Who
Compensates the Victims, 37 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 129
(2012).
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1995 earthquake revealed a 9% penetration ratio. However, this figure has
increased to 23.7% following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake.165
Risk-Based Pricing. According to the Law Concerning Earthquake
Insurance, earthquake insurance applies risk-based premiums. Japan is
divided into seven risk zones, and insurers set premiums based on the
degree of exposure and building types. Earthquake policy premiums
covering industrial risks and other non-household risks, for example, have
normally been applied on an individual basis, depending on the basic
estimate for the building structure (five types) and the location according to
the degree of exposure (seven levels), ranging from 1.1 per thousand
(minimum risk: class A building, level 1 location) to 18.6 per thousand
(maximum risk: class E building, level 7 location). 166 Household
earthquake insurance premiums are also determined in relation to two
additional factors: the location of the property, and the type of
construction.167
This system of premium differentiation is sometimes criticized as
insufficient. For example, the division of zones has been criticized as
extremely rough and crude, and the significant variation in earthquake risk
between classes is not sufficiently reflected in the premium rating.168
Besides the earthquake insurance established by the Law
Concerning Earthquake Insurance, cooperative insurers known as Kyosai
provide the bulk of household coverage, including earthquake coverage.
However, premiums provided by Kyosai do not vary by location and are
less likely to incentivize mitigation measures by policyholders.169
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Contract Design. The JER makes use of deductibles. If the
premium exceeds $550 per policy, this amount is the deductible. Otherwise,
the deductible is equal to the premium of the policy. A maximum limit is
also imposed: the total maximum limit for compensation by all insurers and
government is $55.7 billion per earthquake.170
Loss Prevention. Under the JER regime, more loss prevention is
conducted by the government than by insurers. This is because the
government controls large-scale construction and development projects in
different seismic risk-zones and the coverage and market penetration of
earthquake insurance is not very high—about 20% before the devastating
2011 earthquake—so it follows that the insurers have fewer incentives to
supply loss prevention services.171
Claim Management. Under the JER, claims are made via the
insurance company, and are established in the individual insurance
contract.172
Refusal to Insure. Household earthquake insurers may not refuse to
insure; the insured may choose whether to accept it or not, but the insurers
must provide it. Furthermore, the primary insurers can cede all risks against
earthquakes for reinsurance to the JER (Earthquake Reinsurance Treaty
“A”). The government will assume the ultimate risk.
For earthquake insurance covering business and industrial risks,
insurers make exact assessments of the risks, and are very restrictive in
terms, conditions, and ceilings. However, the supply of earthquake
insurance is quite sufficient, and policyholders can choose from a large
variety of options, including private insurers, the Kyosai, and in some cases
local mutual funds. 173 This regulatory tool, therefore, has limited
applicability in Japan.
170
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Kuang-Yin Lai et al., The 2005 Ilan earthquake doublet and seismic
crisis in northeastern Taiwan: evidence for dyke intrusion associated with
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E. TURKEY
Turkey is a land plagued with earthquakes, which cause two thirds
of all natural catastrophe damages.174 An important attempt to address this
problem is the establishment of the Turkish Compulsory Insurance Pool
(“TCIP”).175 In 1999, Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory
Earthquake Insurance (“Decree Law”) came into force and gave birth to the
TCIP. One of the main objectives of the TCIP is to encourage risk reduction
and to motivate the mitigation practices of households. 176 As a market
insurance mechanism, the TCIP supplies earthquake insurance to
homeowners, and covers losses caused by earthquakes and
earthquake-related catastrophes, such as fires, explosions, landslides, and
tsunamis.177 The Disaster Insurance Law (Law No. 6305), which sets out
the regulations of the compulsory earthquake insurance system in detail,
aims to prevent fraudulent claims and to increase the participation rate.178
As of January 2015, the total number of policies issued was 6.8 million, the
total premiums collected were $380 million, the total paid claims were $80
million, the total payment capacity was $6 billion, and household
participation rate stood at 38.9%.179
The TCIP is a public entity, but has no public sector employees. It
is administered by the TCIP Board of Directors, which consists of seven
members drawn from government agencies, insurance companies, and the
universities. The government appoints an insurance or reinsurance
company as the pool management company to oversee the daily operations
174
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The TCIP was formed with the cooperation of the World Bank, the
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of the TCIP.180 Insurance companies conduct all the business tasks of the
TCIP, including underwriting, claim management, and reinsuring, but they
do not assume any risk. Moreover, when the payments of claims exceed the
capacity of TCIP, the State provides contingent liquidity support.181
Risk-Based Pricing. The TCIP adopts a differential risk-based
pricing approach. According to Article 10 of the Decree Law, three factors
are considered when determining the insurance premiums: location,
construction type, and gross square area.182 The premiums are divided into
fifteen tariff rates, according to the Turkey Seismic Zones Map, and into
three different construction types. 183 Consequently, risk-based pricing
allows the TCIP to considerably reduce moral hazard and adverse
selection.184
Contract Design. The TCIP provides a minimum 2% deductible to
the sum insured in order to avoid “penny claims”.185 The TCIP, moreover,
applies a maximum limit, and the sum for all construction type is NTL
110,000. 186 In addition, there are exclusions in the TCIP policies. For
example, earthquake damage is excluded if the building was constructed
after December 27, 1999, but without any valid construction license.187 The
TCIP also imposes construction maintenance obligations on the insured in
the policies, as Article 14 stipulates:
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Id. at 92. (citing an English Translation of Turkish Governmental
Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory Earthquake Insurance as published in
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meter of the building, construction category and quality, geological
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The owner who causes or allows the building and each independent
section thereof to be altered contrary to the related design and in a
way that will affect the load-bearing system, loses his entitlement
to compensation in as much as the actual loss arises or increases
because of such reason.188
Loss Prevention. The TCIP was initiated as a loss prevention
mechanism. It has played an important role in enhancing and monitoring the
current National Building Code in Turkey,189 and has also implemented
revisions in land use planning and other mitigation plans.190 In addition, the
TCIP pays much attention to education intended to raise public awareness
to catastrophe risk. For example, the TCIP endeavors to introduce the
concept of earthquake risk management and insurance in school
textbooks.191
Claim Management. Homeowners whose houses were damaged as
a result of earthquakes, and those who have a Compulsory Earthquake
Insurance Policy, should consult TCIP or the insurance companies, or both,
within fifteen working days of becoming aware of any damage. 192
Meanwhile, loss adjustment is one of the most critical issues in the whole
operation of the TCIP system due to its role in managing moral hazard of
policyholders. The TCIP retains loss adjusters already employed in the
property insurance companies.193
Refusal to Insure. The TCIP can refuse to insure buildings without
valid construction license or occupancy permits. It may also cancel the
policy if the insureds make alterations to the building contrary to legislation
within the insurance period. 194 The refusal or cancellation of coverage
188
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provides incentives for homeowners or builders to comply with
construction codes, because homeowners who want to register any
real-estate transaction, or open accounts for water and natural gas services,
must present a valid earthquake insurance policy.195
V.

COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION

Controlling moral hazard and providing incentives to mitigate
losses benefit both policyholders and insurers. Such efforts decrease both
risk and cost for policyholders, therefore enhancing profits and financial
solvency for insurers. In the context of climate change, it is especially
important to integrate incentives to risk mitigation in catastrophe insurance
and thus promote climate change adaptation. 196 The below table
summarizes the overview of regulation by catastrophe insurance across the
five countries that were explored in the previous section.
First, the question will be addressed to what extent the five
technical tools aiming at disaster risk reduction are to a greater or lesser
extent employed in the countries examined. Thereby the crucial question
will also be asked to what extent this is encouraged or restricted as a result
of public regulation. Second, a brief assessment of the effectiveness of
disaster risk insurance in the five specific countries will be provided.
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A. THE USE OF TECHNICAL TOOLS
Table 1: Regulation by Catastrophe Insurance Comparative Table
UK
Yes, and
individualized.
No longer under
Flood Re

US
Partially, ¼
policies
subsidized

France
No, flat rate

Japan
Yes, but for
Kyosai +
criticized

Contract
Design

Yes.
Deductibles; a
given limit for
the whole
content
insurance.

Yes.
Deductibles;
maximum
limit.

Yes.
Deductibles;
maximum
limit.

Loss
Prevention

Yes.
Engaging with
government
regulation;
conducting
catastrophe risk
research

Minimal. Low
penetration.

Yes.
Education,
implementing
mitigation
measures.
Monitoring
via the
Building
Code.

Claim
Management

Yes.

Yes.
Time limit.

Yes.

Yes.
Time limit.

Refusal to
Insure

Yes, and it works
well due to de
facto obligation
of homeowners.

Yes.
Mitigation
assistance
programs;
risk-zoning
and risk maps;
building code
regulations.
NFIP
promotes
rebuilding in
high-risk
areas.
Yes, but costs
higher than
private
insurance
scheme.
No.

Yes.
Deductibles;
exclusions; a
given limit for
the whole
property
insurance
policies.
Yes.
Risk
prevention
plan;
mitigation
fund.

No.

No for
household
earthquake
insurance.
Others yes.

Yes.
It works well
combined
with
compulsory
insurance.

Risk-based
Pricing

Turkey
Yes.
The TCI pool
applies and
the law
provides the
context.
Yes.
Deductibles;
maximum
limit;
exclusions;
insureds’
obligation.
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As Table 1 shows, all technical tools of private regulation are used
to a greater or lesser extent in the countries examined. However, the
effectiveness of these technical tools often depends upon the institutional
setting, in other words on the public regulation. Consider for example the
first and probably most important tool (notably to stimulate disaster risk
reduction) being risk-based pricing. In the UK this was allowed and applied
since the state refrained from intervention in premium setting as a result of
the gentlemen’s agreement. As indicated, this is no longer true under the
new Flood Re model. In the United States, however, exactly the opposite is
the case, where risk-based pricing is prohibited by the Homeowner Flood
Insurance Affordability Act. As a result of this, the premiums charged are
substantially less than the actual risk. In France, it is the government that
sets the premium for the Cat.Nat coverage mandatorily by regulation, which
excludes risk-based pricing. In Japan, it is again the law that determines the
system of risk differentiation applied in earthquake insurance, which
according to some is an ineffective tool to provide proper incentives for
disaster risk reduction. Finally, in Turkey it is the law on compulsory
earthquake insurance which created the TCIP that provides the context for
risk-based pricing.
The same conclusion could be reached for the other technical tools
that were examined. Generally, one can conclude that the ability of insurers
to apply technical tools aiming at disaster risk reduction strongly depends
upon the institutional context. For example, the refusal to insure may not be
applied in some countries as it is simply prohibited by regulation. In the UK
the refusal to insure is possible, again under the then existing gentlemen’s
agreement with the government. But in the US the refusal to insure is
basically non-existent for the simple reason that it is not the insurers but the
government that runs the risk under the NFIP. This seems to be the model
towards which the UK is now heading with Flood Re as well. The same
conclusion can be reached for France where the Cat.Nat coverage is
mandatorily included for every individual who purchases (voluntary)
housing insurance. Exclusion of bad risks is hence impossible as a result of
the regulation. And the same conclusion can be reached for Japan. Note that
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in three countries (the US, France and Japan) there is no possibility to refuse
the insurance and insurers are de facto able to transfer the consequences of
bad risks to the government as in all three systems it is the government that
either carries the risk (the US) or generously provides reinsurance (France
and Japan). In those systems, compensation for hard to insure catastrophes
is hence provided as a result of the government intervention, but at the same
time one of the technical tools to stimulate disaster risk reduction by
individuals (the refusal to insure) cannot be employed. The TCIP in Turkey
is an exception where a refusal to insure is possible.
A conclusion from this brief overview is that the possibilities for
insurers to actively provide incentives for disaster risk reduction and hence
play a role as private risk regulators, strongly depends upon the institutional
context and the nature of public regulation. It is often public regulation
itself that prohibits the use of particular technical tools (such as premium
differentiation). Of course, one has to be careful with drawing from this the
policy conclusion that those interventions of public regulation jeopardize
the development of technical tools aimed at disaster risk reduction by
insurers. Of course, it may be the case that in those countries where public
regulation limits the possibilities for insurers to apply tools aiming at
disaster risk reduction, that other legal rules aim at reaching the same goal.
More specifically the government itself could for example (via investments
in public infrastructure) be very active in developing tools of risk reduction
(such as improving the dikes or a levee system). The other alternative would
be that the government imposes a duty on homeowners to invest in disaster
risk reduction via regulation. If that hypothesis were true, the limitations
imposed upon insurers by regulation to apply tools aiming at disaster risk
reduction, would not be that problematic. The government could
compensate for that weakness via investments in disaster risk reduction (via
public infrastructure or regulation). However, there is little evidence of this.
It is known that politicians generally underinvest in disaster precaution
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measures because of limited political pay-offs. 197 There is also
overwhelming evidence that the government systematically underinvests in
disaster precaution as a result of this collective action problem 198 and
regulation directed at homeowners forcing them to take specific
precautionary measures is equally rare; that is why, as was stated in the
introduction, regulation by insurers is often presented as a remedy to failing
public regulation.199 However, the above overview of the technical tools
that would enable insurers to play this role shows that it is often public
regulation that restricts the possibilities of private insurers to impose
measures aimed at disaster risk reduction.
B. COUNTRY COMPARISON
In analyzing the way in which insurance systems described in the
different countries provide incentives for disaster risk reduction one can
come to several conclusions.
Until the beginning of this century the UK private flood insurance
regime was considered a success story. Heavy floods after failing
investments in flood protection by the government changed this picture.200
Relying on risk-based premiums and other regulatory techniques, flood
insurers attempted to mitigate and control the moral hazard of households.
Moreover, “bad risks” were identified and regulated more rigorously, and
these houses became less marketable due to them lacking insurance
coverage. In 2013, due in part to political pressure, the UK government and
the insurers set up Flood Re to guarantee that high flood risk households
could obtain affordable insurance. Insurers charge policyholders at a
197
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premium that will be capped depending on the property’s Council Tax
band, and they will pass into Flood Re those high flood-risk homes.201 With
this new development the high-risk property owners will receive subsidized
insurance coverage, paid by all domestic property owners who have
insurance, thus effectively redistributing from low to high risks.202
The UK system is now effectively more along the line of the NFIP
in the U.S. That system is subject to much stronger moral hazard, due to its
partially risk-based premiums and less efficient claim management. It
implicitly encourages people to live in flood hazard areas and undermines
the private insurance market. 203 It is doubtful whether the NFIP could
assume the future risk and potential losses because of the large number of
people living in the flood-prone areas, and the increase in climate-related
extreme events. It is for that reason that the NFIP has been subject to a lot of
criticism 204 and to proposals for reform. On the one hand it has been
proposed to reform the NFIP towards a model where premiums charged
would better reflect risk;205 on the other hand it is argued that the US should
move to a comprehensive natural disaster insurance regime in line with the
French Cat.Nat model.206
Although the Cat.Nat System of France adopts a flat rate in
catastrophe policies in consideration of solidarity, it does provide some
incentives to mitigation through deductibles, through the municipal loss
prevention plans (although their effectiveness has recently been
challenged), and through claims management. More importantly, such a
mandatory comprehensive catastrophe insurance regime allows insurers to
play a more active role in regulation of individuals’ behaviors than in
voluntary regimes. The French model is followed by other countries, such
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as Belgium, where, since 2005, flooding, earthquakes and other natural
disasters are mandatorily included in all fire insurance policies.207
Risk-based pricing (except for Kyosai) is undoubtedly a positive
aspect of the JER and induces policyholders to take mitigation measures.
However, the insurers’ role is limited because of the low penetration rate
(20%–25%) of earthquake insurance for households. Given Japan’s
vulnerability to serious earthquakes, there seems to be a strong argument in
favor of mandatory earthquake coverage, similar to the French model.
Besides its role in developed countries, catastrophe insurance
becomes an increasingly important form of regulation beyond the State in
many developing countries. The application of the above regulatory tools in
the TCIP affirms Turkey’s image as a good example and a model solution
for developing and middle-income countries.208
VI

EXPANDING THE ROLE OF REGULATION BY
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE IN CHINA
A. REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE IN CHINA

The current mechanism for managing catastrophe risks in China is
known as the Whole-Nation System (“Juguotizhi”), which generally refers
to the government’s efforts to deploy and allocate the whole nation’s
resources to fulfill a specific and difficult task within a limited timeframe,
and thus promote the nation’s interest.209 Under the Whole-Nation System,
the government is committed to restoring social and economic order after a
disaster. However, such government aid easily causes moral hazard, and
creates negative incentives to individuals who historically have a strong
desire to rely on governmental bailout in the wake of a catastrophe. For
207
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 115, at 496; Bruggeman, Faure & Fiore,
supra note 46, at 371.
208
See generally GURENKO ET AL., supra note 81.
209
Peijun Shi & Xin Zhang, Chinese Mechanism against Catastrophe
Risk—the Experience of Great Sichuan Earthquake, 28 J. TSINGHUA U.
(PHIL. & SOC. SCI.) 96, 111 (2013).

2018

REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE

237

example, some pure forms of government bailout, including ad hoc direct
payment and compensation funds, provide insufficient incentives to risk
prevention and loss mitigation.210
To some extent, more government bailouts may contribute to more
disaster losses, because people are more likely to rely on the government to
bail them out than to take precautionary measures. 211 According to an
empirical study on property and causality insurance in five Chinese
provinces, there is a negative correlation between the amount of
government relief and residents’ investment in prevention measures, such
as purchasing insurance.212 Many residents admit that they are exposed to
catastrophe risks, but they seldom transfer risks through insurance because
they believe that the government will bail them out when catastrophes
happen.213
Homeowners insurance is one of the least developed lines in China,
and its penetration rate is quite low. According to a survey using
face-to-face interviews, only 4% of interviewees had bought homeowner
insurance. 214 However, the people’s perception of catastrophe risk and
acceptance of catastrophe insurance presents a more optimistic view. Most
people would accept catastrophe insurance, while only 4% of respondents
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considered catastrophe insurance to be unnecessary.215 The remainder of
this section examines how catastrophe insurance might be used to
supplement or even supplant the State governance through the
Whole-Nation System.216 The possibility and feasibility of regulation by
catastrophe insurance in China will be explored through the examination of
its regulatory techniques.
Risk-Based Pricing. According to field research on Willingness to
Pay (“WTP”), many people are willing to pay more premiums in order to
acquire full coverage of property loss in catastrophe disasters.217 In setting
these premiums, regional differences and construction types should be
taken into account. As was discussed above, the U.K.’s flood insurance
program has set up a good example of this scheme.
Urban and rural areas should receive different treatments in the
proposed catastrophe insurance system, because income inequality has
continued to rise since China’s market-oriented reform.218 Homeowners in
rural areas are low-income, and many of them could not afford insurance.
China may learn from the TCIP, in which compulsory insurance for the
dwellings built in rural areas is not anticipated, and the risk-based pricing is
only applied on registered dwellings in urban areas. In fact, in the
earthquake insurance pilot program in Chuxiong, the State decided to pay
the cost of every rural community’s insurance in order to guarantee
coverage.219
215
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Contract Design. According to the field research, respondents who
have poor house conditions tend to be more aware of earthquakes and have
a stronger desire for insurance.220 High deductibles may induce people to
live away from the hazard-prone areas and choose stronger building stlyes.
When setting deductibles of policies, construction structure, house
conditions, and locations should be important considerations. These tools of
contract design are a common choice in the five catastrophe insurance
programs discussed above.
Loss Prevention. According to the field research, 24.1% of
respondents are not willing to purchase disaster home insurance because
they know very little about insurance, and do not trust insurers. 221
Education, therefore, should be emphasized in insurers’ loss prevention
services in order to create public awareness of the benefits of taking
mitigation measures against catastrophe risks. In addition, if more people
believe in the importance of insurance in addressing catastrophe risk,
catastrophe insurance will reach a higher penetration rate, as there is a
strong positive correlation between the two.222
Claim Management. Insurers in China do not perform loss
adjustment and claim settlement well. According to the field research, 23%
of interviewees indicated that they do not trust insurers’ claim management.
Afraid of getting no payment after disasters, they are not willing to purchase
catastrophe insurance. 223 Insurers, therefore, should increase their
transparency and efficiency in order to regain the public’s trust.
Refusal to Insure. Concerted measures and policy are required in
order for this regulatory technique to play a role in China. China could
follow the examples of the TCIP. Specifically, the country should consider
requiring homeowners who want to register any real-estate transaction, or
open accounts for water and natural gas services, to present a valid
earthquake insurance policy. Further, China should consider adopting the
220
221
222
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procedures of the NFIP, which stipulates that only through acquiring flood
insurance for their homes, can homeowners in the 1/100 flood zone get
home mortgage credits granted or secured by federal bodies or credit
agencies.
In 1998, the People’s Bank of China (i.e. the Chinese Central Bank)
issued the Residential Mortgage Regulation, which states that before the
mortgage contract is concluded, the mortgagor is required to obtain
household insurance or to relegate this task to the mortgagee (Article 25).
However, in 2006, the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued a
notice forbidding banks from stipulating with mandatory effect that
residential mortgage insurance must be acquired. 224 Although acquiring
household insurance is not related to mortgages, loans or other financial
services, it is still beneficial to review the series regulations and explore the
feasibility of such concerted measures to be used for the take-up of
catastrophe insurance.
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURERS
There is little doubt that catastrophe insurers could influence the
consumers’ behavior. What is less clear is how effective is this influence.
Theoretically speaking, both insurers and consumers present obstacles that
may limit the effectiveness of regulation by catastrophe insurance.
Catastrophe insurers may be reluctant to supply coverage for several
reasons. First, insufficient catastrophe data impedes insurers’ efforts to
identify, quantify, and estimate the chances of disasters, and to set
premiums for catastrophe risks. Second, China’s primary insurance
industry does not yet have the capacity to deal with catastrophe risks, as
property insurance companies do not have the capital to fully cover disaster
losses. Lastly, there are still legal restrictions that contradict catastrophe
insurers’ role in regulations.
Consumers, on the other hand, may reject or ignore the insurers’
risk management advice, or indeed have little interest in buying catastrophe
224
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insurance at all. The Whole-Nation System turns relying on government’s
compensation into the rational choice. Moreover, due to the low-probability
nature of catastrophe disasters, and the non-rational behavior of consumers,
awareness of loss prevention is quite weak.225 As a result, the individual’s
incentive to buy insurance is diminishing.
This situation is beginning to change. Recently, China began to
demand the insurance industry complement government actions in
addressing catastrophe risk. The 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake and many
other natural disasters over the following years, such as floods and
typhoons, made the central government leaders acknowledge the
contribution of insurance in regulating policyholders and compensating
victims. In 2013, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee
promulgated the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China on Some Major Issues concerning Comprehensively
Deepening the Reform. Chapter III is titled “Accelerating the Improvement
of the Modern Market System,” and expressly states that “we will establish
an insurance system for catastrophe risks.” Later on, in 2014, catastrophe
insurance program trials were launched in Shenzhen, in the Pearl River
Delta (a densely populated metropolitan area and also one of the world’s
most disaster-prone regions), 226 and in the Chuxiong region in the
southwestern province of Yunnan, known to be prone to earthquakes.227
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With the implementation of new practices in the near future, there
is a growing need to explore the effectiveness of catastrophe insurance. This
exploration should be carried out by observing and interviewing
catastrophe insurance personnel (such as insurers, brokers, actuaries, loss
prevention specialists, and claims professionals), a cross-section of
consumers through different pilot programs, regulators of catastrophe
insurance, and other government officials whose work relates to the
Whole-Nation System. This will be a prodigious undertaking, but it will
give researchers the opportunity to apply and evaluate regulation by
catastrophe insurance in China.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The starting point for this article was a discussion of recent
findings in the literature that insurers increasingly act as private risk
regulators, substituting or complementing public regulation. Our aim was to
examine which technical tools insurers precisely use to execute this task,
more particularly in the important domain of the insurance for natural
disasters such as flooding and earthquakes. We identified five technical
tools that can be employed by insurers to on the one hand control the moral
hazard risk and on the other hand provide incentives for disaster risk
reduction (risk-based pricing, contract design, loss prevention, claims
management and refusal to insure). In line with the literature claiming that
insurers act as private regulators, we found that when these technical tools
are indeed effectively applied insurers can fulfil their task in contributing to
disaster risk reduction. However, when we then examined the possibilities
in specific countries (UK, France, US, Japan and Turkey) to apply these
technical tools we noticed that the possibilities to do so in practice are often
limited, precisely as a result of public regulation. Public regulation would
for example prohibit premium differentiation (to promote affordability of
insurance) or prohibit a refusal to insure (in order to guarantee an equal
e/20140820/NEWS04/140829990?AllowView=VDl3UXk1T3hDUFNCbk
JiYkY1TDJaRUt0ajBRV0ErOVVHUT09#.
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access to catastrophe insurance for all citizens). As a result of those
restrictions following from public regulation insurers can in many legal
systems often not fully play their role as private risk regulators. It would of
course be too early to simply conclude that therefore the interventions by
public regulation are necessarily undesirable. However, the interesting
challenge is to examine whether it is possible to combine the political
desiderata (for example of providing affordable disaster insurance to all) in
a model whereby insurers could still apply their technical tools aiming at
disaster risk reduction. 228 That would allow insurers still to play their
important role as private regulators, thus substituting or complementing
public regulation aiming at disaster risk reduction.
Our contribution mostly focused on the question of how the tools to
control moral hazard in catastrophe insurance are implemented in five
countries. Another equally interesting question is also why the countries we
examined show such a variance in the implementation of tools to control
moral hazard. Analyzing that question went beyond the scope of this paper
but could undoubtedly be an interesting point for further research.
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